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Abstract
Emotions change our perception of time. In the past, this has been attributed primarily to emotions speeding up an
‘‘internal clock’’ thereby increasing subjective time estimates. Here we probed this account using an S1/S2 temporal
discrimination paradigm. Participants were presented with a stimulus (S1) followed by a brief delay and then a second
stimulus (S2) and indicated whether S2 was shorter or longer in duration than S1. We manipulated participants’ emotions by
presenting a task-irrelevant picture following S1 and preceding S2. Participants were more likely to judge S2 as shorter than
S1 when the intervening picture was emotional as compared to neutral. This effect held independent of S1 and S2 modality
(Visual: Exps. 1, 2, & 3; Auditory: Exp. 4) and intervening picture valence (Negative: Exps. 1, 2 & 4; Positive: Exp. 3). Moreover,
it was replicated in a temporal reproduction paradigm (Exp. 5) where a timing stimulus was preceded by an emotional or
neutral picture and participants were asked to reproduce the duration of the timing stimulus. Taken together, these findings
indicate that emotional experiences may decrease temporal estimates and thus raise questions about the suitability of
internal clock speed explanations of emotion effects on timing. Moreover, they highlight attentional mechanisms as a viable
alternative.
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Introduction
In an effort to distinguish man from beast, ancient philosophers
dissociated thought from passion and attributed thought to the
workings of the brain and passion to the workings of other bodily
organs [1]. Although research since then has demonstrated
thought in non-human animals and identified the brain as the
substrate for both thought and the subjective feeling state called
emotion [2], it is only recently that putative interactions between
emotions and various cognitive functions have been subject to
significant research (for a review see [3]). This work demonstrated
that emotions facilitate perceptual processing by lowering the
threshold for awareness [4]; items of emotional relevance to the
observer are more likely to be noticed than are neutral items.
Emotions have also been found to influence memory [5]; images
and verbalinformation arebetter remembered if they areemotional
as compared to neutral [6–8]. Furthermore, there is evidence for
emotions affecting language. Positive emotional states enhance the
spread of activation among associatively linked words in semantic
memory making it easier for individuals to relate these words and to
generate ideas based on their perceived relationship [9].
Amidst the growth of studies on the interaction between emotion
and cognition, insights into the role of emotions on interval timing
have remained limited. Interval timing typically refers to our
capacity to monitor and store durations in the hundreds of
milliseconds to minutes range and to adjust our behavior based
on these durations. For example, we may have a stored temporal
representation of how long it takes for someone to answer a knock at
their door. Thus, if a person fails to open the door within that time
period, we will not continue knocking indefinitely, but will instead
move on once the evoked temporal representation has elapsed.
Sensitivity to time is a fundamental aspect of many higher order
cognitive processes including decision making, memory and
language (for a review see [10]). As such it has been a vivid area
of research resulting in a number of interval timing models. The
most influential model to date is Scalar Expectancy Theory (SET)
[11]. The information-processing version of SET [12] postulates
clock, memory, and decisionstages. When timingthe duration of an
event, pulses from a pacemaker accumulate to form a temporal
representation of the currently elapsing duration. This temporal
representationiscomparedwithdurationrepresentationspreviously
stored in memory and behavior results when the current interval
exceeds some threshold of similarity to the remembered interval.
According to this model, interval timing taps a range of cognitive
functions including perception, attention, and memory. Thus, when
considering the potential influence of emotions on interval timing,
the relationship between emotions and these functions may prove
critical.
An indication of a role for emotions in time perception comes
from both linguistics and timing experiments. The saying ‘‘time
drags’’ is typically used in the context of negative or boring events,
whereas the saying ‘‘time flies’’ is used in the context of positive or
exciting events [13–14]. Thus, one may infer that positive
emotions lead to an underestimation of duration, whereas negative
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experimental research indicates that positive and negative
emotions have a similar impact on interval timing. Both
apparently lead individuals to overestimate the passing of time.
When participants were asked to judge or reproduce the duration
of a stimulus, the reported or produced durations were longer
when the stimulus was positive or negative as compared to neutral
[15–19]. Explanations of the effect of emotion on interval timing
in these studies rely on pacemaker-accumulator timing models and
their presumed clock components. Moreover, they draw on the
idea that pacemaker rate is influenced by bodily arousal as
reflected by peripheral markers such as heart rate or skin
conductance [20]. Accordingly, positive and negative stimuli are
believed to increase arousal thus speeding up the pacemaker and
causing a greater number of pulses to be accumulated. Therefore,
positive and negative stimuli are experienced as longer than
equivalent duration neutral stimuli.
While pacemaker rate [21] is a possible mechanism through
which emotions can influence timing, it is not the only one. Some
researchers propose that emotion effects are mediated by attention
[22–24]. This proposal rests on evidence that temporal estimates
vary as a function of attention [25–27]. For example, temporal
estimates are shorter if attention is distracted by a concurrent
verbal task [28]. The information-processing version of SET
accommodates these and similar findings [29–30]. It holds
attention responsible for whether the mode switch allows transfer
of pulses from the pacemaker to the accumulator [29]. This switch
may ‘‘flicker’’ or oscillate between the open and closed states
during the timing signal [31–33]. Hence, when more attention is
allocated to the timing signal, a larger number of pulses are
accumulated and the duration seems longer as compared to a
situation in which less attention is allocated to the timing signal.
Thus, if emotional events enhance attention to the timing signal
above baseline levels, they may inadvertently contribute to a larger
number of pulses being collected and lead to event duration being
perceived as longer than the duration of an equally long, but
emotionally neutral, event.
Evidence for the later proposition comes from research that
highlights the capacity of emotional stimuli to capture and hold
attention. For example, visual search studies indicate that
participants are faster at detecting an emotional target among
neutral distracters and slower at detecting a neutral target among
emotional distracters relative to an all neutral baseline [34].
Likewise, experiments using the Posner spatial cueing paradigm
[35] revealed that participants are more likely to benefit from valid
cues if they are emotional as compared to neutral [36].
Additionally, they are less likely to disengage from invalid
emotional as compared to neutral cues [37]. Thus, one may
speculate that the attentional advantage gained by encoding
emotional as compared to neutral stimuli modulates the
accumulation of pacemaker pulses and perceived stimulus
duration. If true, timing an emotional event should produce a
longer duration estimate because more pulses accumulate than
when timing a neutral event. Moreover, the opposite effect should
emerge when individuals time a neutral event in the context of an
emotional or neutral distracter. The emotional distracter should be
more successful in diverting attention away from the target event
resulting in shorter duration estimates than in the context of a
neutral distracter.
While there is ample evidence of participants overestimating the
duration of emotional relative to neutral events [15–19], the role of
emotional and neutral distracters for the timing of neutral events
has not yet been explored. To fill this gap, we employed an S1/S2
temporal discrimination paradigm. In this paradigm, a stimulus
(S1) was presented and the participant was asked to encode its
duration. After a short retention interval, a second stimulus (S2)
appeared and the participant indicated whether it was shorter or
longer than the first one. During the retention interval, a picture
with emotional or neutral content was presented to manipulate the
participant’s emotion independently of the timing task. If, as
proposed previously, emotions affect time perception by modulat-
ing pacemaker rate, this paradigm should reveal an overestimation
of S2 duration on trials with emotional as compared to neutral
task-irrelevant images. Heightened arousal on these trials should
cause a higher pacemaker rate and more pulses to be accumulated
[38]. If, however, emotions affect time perception by modulating
attention, we should observe an underestimation of S2 duration on
emotional as compared to neutral trials. A diversion of attentional
resources from the monitoring of time to the processing of
emotionally relevant information should cause participants to miss
pacemaker pulses and thus to perceive the interval as shorter.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants. Fourteen female college students participated
in the present study in fulfillment of an introductory psychology
course requirement. Their mean age was 19.6 years (SD=0.65).
They were all right-handed [39] and reported normal or corrected
to normal vision.
Materials. A filled circle 1.7 cm in diameter was used as the
timing stimulus (i.e., S1 and S2). Sixty-four task-irrelevant images
were selected from the International Affective Picture System
(IAPS [40]). Half the images were negative with a mean arousal
rating of 6.15 (range 5.25–7.35) and a mean valence rating of 2.22
(range 1.51–2.95). The remaining pictures were neutral with a
mean arousal rating of 2.70 (range 1.76–3.29) and a mean valence
rating of 5.10 (range 4.45–6.28). Examples of negative pictures
include mutilated body parts, assault, and toilet scenes. Examples
of neutral pictures include an elderly man, plants, and building
scenes. All stimuli were presented on a black background in the
center of a computer screen.
Procedure. Participants were seated in front of a computer
screen, instructed on their task and subsequently commenced the
experiment. Each trial in the experiment began with the
presentation of a fixation cross at screen center for 500 ms
followed by a 500 ms blank screen. Then, a circle (S1) appeared
for 1200 ms followed by another blank screen of 1400, 1600,
1800, or 2000 ms duration. Next, the participant saw a negative or
a neutral picture for 800 ms, followed by a 500 ms blank screen
and another circle (S2). S2 was either shorter (i.e., 1040 or
1120 ms) or longer (i.e., 1280 or 1360 ms) than S1. Participants
were informed that distracter pictures interleaved every S1/S2
pair and were asked to simply keep looking at the screen. The task
instruction was to compare the duration of the two circles (S1 and
S2) and to indicate whether S2 was shorter or longer than S1 by
pressing one of two buttons on a response box following S2 offset.
A new trial started 6300, 6600, 6900, or 7200 ms after the offset of
S2 (Fig. 1).
There were 64 trials in the experiment. Each S2 duration was
presented 8 times in the negative condition and 8 times in the
neutral emotion condition. Trial order was randomized and the
assignment of response buttons to response alternatives was
counterbalanced across participants.
Results
Probability of responding ‘‘shorter’’ was subjected to an
ANOVA with Emotion (negative, neutral) and S2 Duration (4
Emotion Effects on Timing
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effects of S2 Duration (F(3, 39)=73.24, p,.001, g
2
partial=.849)
and Emotion (F(1, 13)=9.67, p,.01, g
2
partial=.426). Participants
were more likely to respond ‘‘shorter’’ with decreasing S2 duration
and when S2 was preceded by a negative as compared to a neutral
picture (Fig. 2). The absence of an interaction between S2
Duration and Emotion (p..1) indicated that the two main effects
were independent.
Discussion
In contrast to previous studies, we found that participants
underestimated stimulus duration during emotional as compared
to neutral trials. Specifically, participants in the present experi-
ment were more likely to indicate that S2 duration was shorter
than that of S1 when S2 was preceded by a negative as compared
to neutral picture. Given the nature of the present paradigm, one
may speculate that attention, rather than pacemaker rate,
accounts for the observed effects. Emotional modulation of
attention may have caused participants to accumulate fewer
pacemaker pulses such that perceived S2 duration was reduced.
However, before such a conclusion can be drawn, alternative
accounts require consideration. Specifically, it is possible that the
relatively short interval between the picture and S2 accounts for
the observed effects. Perhaps the negative picture engaged
perceptual mechanisms that led to a transient distraction causing
the participant to miss S2 onset.
Evidence for this possibility comes from research employing the
‘‘attentional blink’’ paradigm. In this paradigm, participants are
presented with a stream of distracters and one or two targets.
Participants are likely to miss a second target if it closely follows
the first target [41–42]. Based on this evidence researchers argued
that attention capturing stimuli elicit an attentional blink, which
may last up to 500 ms and which compromises the perception of
subsequent information. Although the present study used picture
durations of 800 ms, which exceeds the typical stimulus duration
of an attentional blink paradigm (,100 ms), the interval between
picture offset and S2 onset was only 500 ms. Thus, one may ask
whether emotional pictures, due to their capacity for attention
capture [43], elicited an extended attentional blink that accounts
Figure 1. The sequence and duration of stimuli during a trial in Experiment 1 are shown.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021829.g001
Figure 2. The group mean probability of responding ‘‘shorter’’
and standard error of the mean are plotted for each S2
duration in Experiment 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021829.g002
Emotion Effects on Timing
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pictures may have induced an attentional blink causing partici-
pants to miss the onset of S2 and thus temporal pulses. To test this
possibility, we conducted a second experiment in which the
interval between picture offset and S2 onset was 2000 ms. All
other parameters were as in Experiment 1.
Experiment 2
Method
Participants. Fifteen female college students participated in
the present study in fulfillment of an introductory psychology
course requirement. Their mean age was 18.9 years (SD=0.64).
They were all right-handed [39] and reported normal or corrected
to normal vision.
Materials and Procedure. In Experiment 2, a blank
computer screen was presented for 2000 ms between the offset
of the picture and the onset of S2. Nevertheless, the average trial
duration was comparable to Experiment 1 as the intervals between
trials were shortened to 5300 and 6200 ms. All other parameters
were left unchanged.
Results
Analysis of the probability of responding ‘‘shorter’’ revealed
significant main effects of S2 Duration (F(3, 42)=59.07, p,.001,
g
2
partial=.808) and Emotion (F(1, 14)=5.15, p,.05, g
2
par-
tial=.269). Participants were more likely to respond ‘‘shorter’’
with decreasing S2 duration and when S2 was preceded by a
negative as compared to a neutral picture (Fig. 3). S2 Duration
and Emotion failed to interact (p..1).
Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 are similar to those of Experiment
1. Thus, we can exclude the possibility that the effects elicited in
Experiment 1 reflect an attentional blink following negative
pictures. Instead, we argue that the negative pictures triggered
emotional processes that distracted individuals from monitoring
the S2 duration, leading to a loss of pacemaker pulses and a
temporal underestimation relative to the neutral condition. In a
third experiment, we sought to replicate this observation and to
determine whether it is specific to negative emotions. Past research
revealed consistent evidence for attention capture and distraction
by negative emotional events [44–45]. However, evidence for a
similar role of positive emotions remains rare. Moreover,
compared to positive stimuli, potentially threatening stimuli are
more readily detected in visual search paradigms and more easily
conditioned [34,43,46]. Thus, some researchers argue that
negative events are more imperative for survival and thus more
successful in modulating attention [34,43,46]. Given that the
emotion effect on timing observed here is postulated to arise from
attentional modulation, it may be specific to negative emotions.
We tested this idea by conducting a third experiment using
positive pictures to elicit an emotional state.
Experiment 3
Method
Participants. Thirteen female college students participated
in the present study in fulfillment of an introductory psychology
course requirement. Their mean age was 20.2 years (SD=1.1).
They were all right-handed [39] and reported normal or corrected
to normal vision.
Materials and Procedure. Experiment 3 was equivalent to
Experiment 1 with the exception that the negative IAPS pictures
were replaced by positive IAPS pictures. Examples of positive
pictures are erotic couple, fireworks, and roller coaster scenes.
Positive pictures had a mean arousal rating of 5.72 (range 5.08–
6.99) and a mean valence rating of 7.29 (range 6.56–8.22). The
mean arousal rating of the positive pictures used in Experiment 3
was significantly lower (t(1,62)=3.25, p=.002) than that of the
negative pictures used in Experiment 1. Additionally, the absolute
differences of the positive and negative pictures’ valence ratings
from the mean valence rating of the neutral items were compared.
The negative pictures were more different from the neutral
pictures than were the positive pictures (t(1,62)=7.14, p,.001).
Results
Analysis of the probability of responding ‘‘shorter’’ revealed
significant main effects of S2 Duration (F(3, 36)=54.86, p,.001,
g
2
partial=.821) and Emotion (F(1, 12)=5.28, p,.05, g
2
par-
tial=.305). Participants were more likely to respond ‘‘shorter’’
with decreasing S2 duration and when S2 was preceded by a
positive as compared to a neutral picture (Fig. 4). S2 Duration and
Emotion failed to interact (p..1).
A direct comparison between positive and negative conditions
wasconductedbysubjectingthedatafromExperiments1 and3to a
3-way Experiment (1 vs. 3)6Emotion (emotional vs. neutral)6S2
Duration (4 levels) mixed design ANOVA with probability of
responding ‘‘shorter’’ as the dependent variable. There was a
significant S2 Duration effect (F(3, 75)=126.32, p,.001, g
2
par-
tial=.835) and a significant Emotion effect (F(1, 25)=14.53, p,.01,
g
2
partial=.368). Importantly, neither the Experiment main effect
nor an interaction with Experiment reached significance (ps..1).
Finally, we explored the contribution of picture valence and
arousal to the observed effects in Experiment 1 and 3. IAPS
Figure 3. The group mean probability of responding ‘‘shorter’’
and standard error of the mean are plotted for each S2
duration in Experiment 2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021829.g003
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subtracting 5 (the rating scale midpoint) from each value and
taking the absolute value of the result. A correlation analysis for
these and the IAPS arousal scores revealed that both measures
were highly correlated (r=.94, p,.0001). We subsequently tested
two ANOVA models to determine whether and in what way each
measure predicted the probability of responding ‘‘shorter’’ in
Experiments 1 and 3. The first model included Emotional
Intensity and Experiment as factors and returned a significant
effect of Emotional Intensity (F(1,124)=5.6, p,.05) with all other
effects being non-significant (p..1). The second model included
Arousal and Experiment as factors and returned a significant effect
of Arousal (F(1,124)=5.2, p,.05) with all other effects being non-
significant (p..1).
Discussion
Participants perceived the duration of a stimulus to be shorter
when it was preceded by a positive as compared to a neutral
picture. Given that this effect was comparable to that observed for
negative pictures, one may conclude that positive and negative
stimuli similarly affect S2 duration estimation. S2 is perceived to
be shorter when immediately preceded by emotional as compared
to neutral stimuli. A discussion of non-specific emotion mecha-
nisms by which this effect may occur is presented in the General
Discussion.
Below we report a fourth experiment aimed at addressing the
question of whether emotion induced changes in attention to time
are limited to within modality processing or persist when emotion
and timing information come from different modalities. This
question is important as attention is a limited resource [35] and
emotion effects may spread more readily within than across
modalities. Research investigating cross-modal integration found
attention to be guided by cross-modal signals [47–48]. Cross-
modal signals, even if task-irrelevant and uninformative, appear to
facilitate the processing of spatially overlapping targets. Existing
research further implies that cross-modal influences on attention
are stronger for emotional as compared to neutral stimuli [49–50].
For example, Brosch and colleagues presented angry and neutral
vocalizations dichotically to the left and right ears of participants
who were engaged in a visual target detection task. Target
detection was enhanced when angry vocalizations were played at
the same side as a visual target relative to when they were played
at the opposite side. While revealing with respect to cross-modal
influences of emotion on attention, this evidence is limited to
spatial processing. Moreover, it is unclear what, if any, cross-
modal influence would be observed on temporal processing. To
address this question, we conducted a fourth experiment in which
participants timed the duration of auditory stimuli before and after
viewing neutral and negative pictures.
Experiment 4
Method
Participants. Eighteen female college students participated
in the present study in fulfillment of an introductory psychology
course requirement. Their mean age was 19.9 years (SD=0.77).
They were all right-handed [39] and reported normal or corrected
to normal vision.
Procedures. Experiment 4 was equivalent to Experiment 1,
with the exception that the timing stimulus (i.e., S1/S2) was a
500 Hz pure tone rather than a circle.
Results
Analysis of the probability of responding ‘‘shorter’’ revealed
significant main effects of S2 Duration (F(3, 51)=71.01, p,.001,
g
2
partial=.807) and of Emotion (F(1, 17)=6.75, p,.05, g
2
partial
=.284). Participants were more likely to respond ‘‘shorter’’ for
shorter S2 Durations and when S2 was preceded by a negative as
compared to a neutral picture (Fig. 5). The interaction effect was
non-significant (p..1).
Discussion
In line with Experiments 1–3, participants underestimated the
duration of S2 when it was preceded by an emotional as compared
to a neutral picture. Given that Experiment 4 used an auditory
timing stimulus and manipulated participant emotions through
visual stimuli, these results suggest that the effects of emotion on
time perception are not limited to within-modality processes, but
extend to across modality processes.
Together the current results are opposite to those typically
reported in the literature. Emotions here led to temporal
underestimation rather than overestimations thus making an
attention account a viable competitor of the existing pacemaker
account. Nevertheless, one may object that the divergence in
results stems from a divergence in methodology, which employed
an S1–S2 paradigm in the present case as opposed to the bisection
or temporal reproduction paradigms in past research. Therefore,
emotion effects on responses may not reflect a shortening of S2 but
a lengthening of S1, which was being encoded and maintained in
working memory during the emotional challenge. To address this
possibility we conducted a final experiment in which each trial
comprised the presentation of an emotional or a neutral picture
followed by a sample duration, which participants were required
to reproduce. If emotions increase the sense of passed and passing
Figure 4. The group mean probability of responding ‘‘shorter’’
and standard error of the mean are plotted for each S2
duration in Experiment 3.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021829.g004
Emotion Effects on Timing
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with an emotional as compared to a neutral image. If, however,
emotions distract from the monitoring of time when dissociated
from the timing signal, then participants should produce shorter
durations when primed with an emotional as compared to a
neutral image.
Experiment 5
Method
Participants. Eighteen female college students participated
in the present study in fulfillment of an introductory psychology
course requirement. The data of four participants was discarded
because they were unable to accurately discriminate the durations
presented for reproduction. The mean age of the remaining
participants was 22.4 years (SD=1.86). They were all right-
handed [39] and reported normal or corrected to normal vision.
Procedures. A trial started with the presentation of a fixation
cross, which remained on screen for 500 ms. The cross was
followed by a picture presentation for 800 ms. After a short empty
interval of 500 ms, a circle appeared on the screen for 1100, 1700
or 2300 ms. After a longer empty interval of 5500 ms, a 500 ms
cross prompted participants to attend to the onset of another
circle. Participants were asked to push a button when they thought
the duration of the second circle matched that of the first circle.
Inter-trial intervals were equally distributed among 1800, 2100,
and 2400 ms.
The visual stimuli used here were comparable to those of
Experiment 1. On half the trials, a timing stimulus was preceded
by an emotionally negative picture, whereas on the remaining
trials it was preceded by a neutral picture. There were a total of 30
emotional and 30 neutral trials with one third each for the 1100,
1700 and 2300 ms duration conditions. Trials were presented in
random order.
Results
We computed mean reaction times and standard deviations for
each participant across all experimental conditions and removed
trials from the analysis in which participants deviated more than
two standard deviations from their respective mean. Using the
remaining trials, we then computed means for each participant
and condition and subjected those to an ANOVA with Emotion
(negative, neutral) and Duration (1100, 1700, 2300) as repeated
measures factors. This analysis revealed an Emotion main effect
(F(1, 13)=11.23, p,.01, g
2
partial=0.46) indicating that partici-
pants reproduced shorter durations when the timing signal was
preceded by an emotional as compared to a neutral image. The
Duration effect was also significant (F(2, 26)=226.32, p,.0001,
g
2
partial=0.94) indicating that participants temporal reproductions
were shortest for the 1100 ms condition, intermediate for the
1700 ms condition and longest for the 2300 ms condition
(Figure 6). The interaction of Emotion and Duration was non-
significant (p..1).
Discussion
The subjective shortening of duration when the timing stimulus
was preceded by an emotional stimulus in the reproduction
paradigm of Experiment 5 confirms that the results of Experiments
Figure 5. The group mean probability of responding ‘‘shorter’’
and standard error of the mean are plotted for each S2
duration in Experiment 4.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021829.g005
Figure 6. The group mean response time and standard error of
the mean are plotted for each target duration in Experiment 5.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021829.g006
Emotion Effects on Timing
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paradigm. Moreover, Experiment 5 eliminates the possibility that
they were due to emotional events lengthening duration
representations that are concurrently maintained in working
memory. Rather, emotional events seem to affect temporal
processing prospectively. Compared to neutral events, emotional
events shorten the perception of subsequently presented timing
signals.
General Discussion
The present study set out to investigate the influence of
emotions on time perception. Of particular interest was whether
pacemaker rate or attention represents a more viable mechanism
for emotional effects on timing. Across five experiments, we found
that participants perceived a timing stimulus as shorter when it was
preceded by an emotional as compared to a neutral distracter.
Moreover, this effect was observed for within modality and across
modality manipulations, for positively and negatively valenced
emotional distracters, for 500 ms and 2000 ms intervals between
the distracter and the timing stimulus, and was independent of the
type of timing response (i.e., temporal discrimination or repro-
duction) participants made.
Together these results challenge the idea that emotions
influence time perception merely by influencing pacemaker rate.
If that were the case, then the present study should have replicated
prior work indicating that participants overestimate the duration
of emotional as compared to neutral events [15–19]. That is to say,
the emotional distracters in the present study should have
increased pacemaker rate and allowed more pulses to be
accumulated. Compared to the condition with neutral distracters,
this should have reduced the proportion of ‘‘shorter’’ responses to
the S2. As we found the opposite pattern of results, a mechanism
other than pacemaker rate likely accounts for our effects. We
propose attention to be this mechanism and in the following
paragraphs suggest some possible ways by which emotions might
alter attention to affect changes in time perception.
First, it is possible that participants directed greater attention to
the encoding of emotional as compared to neutral pictures and
thus tended to miss the onset of the timing stimulus. In support of
this, we found the emotion effect to be statistically independent of
timing stimulus duration. However, the durations used here may
not have been different enough and/or the statistical power too
small to detect duration related changes in the emotion effect. In
support of this, we found that emotion induced underestimation
was unaffected by an increase in the interval between the emotion
stimulus and the timing stimulus in Experiment 2. This increase
should have reduced an underestimation effect due to a delayed
latency to begin timing because participants had more time to
recover their attention. Moreover, in Experiment 5 participants
reproduced shorter durations in the emotion condition despite the
fact that they were prompted about the impending reproduction of
the timing stimulus. Finally, the condition means in the latter
experiment suggest that the temporal shortening effect increases
from the short (56 ms), to the intermediate (61 ms) to the long
duration condition (91 ms). Thus, there are likely other attentional
mechanisms contributing to the present results besides a mere
onset effect.
One such mechanism could involve the effect of non-specific
bodily arousal on attention. Previous research has indicated a
relationship between bodily arousal and cognitive performance,
which is commonly known as the Yerkes-Dodson law [51].
According to this law, cognitive performance increases with
increasing arousal up to an optimal level. Once this arousal level is
passed, cognitive performance declines. Although the Yerkes-
Dodson law has been criticized [52], past findings were generally
supportive making it a candidate explanation for emotion effects
on timing. Accordingly, the mix of moderately and highly arousing
images used here may have led to a general cognitive impairment
that included attention and thus impacted participants’ ability to
monitor time. This assertion is supported by the fact that temporal
judgments were related to arousal. However, as they were equally
strongly related to emotion intensity, bodily arousal may not or not
solely account for the observed effects.
A final mechanism we would like to propose involves attention
capture by appraisal processes and/or emotion regulation
attempts [53–54]. Preoccupation with such processes could deter
participants from focusing on the timing task. Neuroimaging
research revealed an involvement of lateral and medial prefrontal
cortex in both emotion appraisal [55] and emotion regulation
[56]. Given that similar substrates have been implicated in the
perception of time [57–58], emotion regulation might compete
with time perception for these neural resources.
Although our data support an attention account, one may
object that a pacemaker rate account cannot be fully ruled out.
This is because participants may have used the emotional/neutral
picture as a reference for judging or reproducing the target
duration. As emotional stimuli were found to be overestimated in
previous studies, a longer timing reference may have led to an
underestimation of the target. However, the following consider-
ation makes this possibility implausible. Changes in arousal after
an emotional challenge develop in time and increases in arousal
markers such as heart rate and skin conductance have been noted
to peak between 3 to 6 seconds following stimulus onset [59–60].
Given the interval between picture onset and the imperative
timing signal varied from 1.3 to 2.8 seconds across the present
experiments, an arousal effect should have been smaller during
picture processing than during S2 processing and thus increased
the probability of ‘longer’ responses. However, we observed the
opposite result indicating that pacemaker rate is ill-suited to
explain the relationship between emotion and time. Instead,
attention capture by the emotional distracter appears more
appropriate.
Although the pacemaker account has been very popular as an
explanation of the relationship between emotion and time, the
present work is not the first to suggest a relationship between
emotion, attention, and time. For example, Meck and MacDonald
[24] observed that lesions to the amygdala, a structure known to
mediate the attentional bias towards emotional events, caused a
deficit in the temporal estimation of threat stimuli. This deficit was
comparable to that caused by lesions to the prefrontal cortex, a
structure implicated in attentional control [24]. Furthermore, a
study by Gil and colleagues [23] found time estimates to be shorter
for disgusting food pictures as compared to neutral pictures.
Unlike threat-relevant stimuli, disgusting stimuli are disease salient
and only harmful if we approach them. Thus, rather than eliciting
a fight-or-flight response, they simply warn us to stay away [61].
Therefore, Gil and colleagues [23] argued that the perception of
disgusting stimuli causes attentional diversion and temporal pulses
to be lost.
Although prior work cited above raises the possibility that
attention capture or aversion modulate the relationship between
emotion and time, it does not exclude a pacemaker account. Apart
from modulating attention, lesions to the amygdala are known to
impair arousal responses to emotional stimuli [62–63], which
offers an alternative explanation for the timing impairments seen
by Meck and MacDonald [24]. Moreover, in the study by Gil and
colleagues [23], disgust was likely associated with a reduction in
Emotion Effects on Timing
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slow down during disgusting experiences [64] and thus the
temporal underestimation of disgusting images could be due to
pacemaker rate decreasing and fewer temporal pulses being
accumulated. Given that these interpretive difficulties do not apply
to the present work, it can be considered a meaningful extension of
the literature on emotion, attention, and time.
Conclusion
The present set of experiments demonstrates that individuals
underestimate the duration of a neutral stimulus if that stimulus is
presented in an emotional as compared to neutral context. This is
true regardless of whether the emotion is positive or negative
suggesting that both positive and negative experiences can affect
timing in similar ways. The mechanism by which this occurs is
unlikely to involve the pacemaker, but instead may arise from a
modulation of attention. If true, this would lend a parsimonious
explanation of why emotions can both slow down and speed up
everyday experiences. A slowing down of perceived time may
occur when individuals wish for an experience to end quickly and
hence direct resources towards monitoring the passing of time. In
contrast, a speeding up of time occurs when the experience
captures attention leaving the passing of time unnoticed and
leading us to believe that ‘‘time flies’’.
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